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Introduction: The Call for a Marriage Amendment
Throughout 2004 President Bush called upon Congress to "promptly pass and to send to the
States for ratification an amendment to our Constitution defining and protecting marriage as a
union of man and woman as husband and wife." [1] He claimed that the sanctity of marriage--a
fundamental, cherished institution--is under attack and subject to annihilation if same-sex
couples are allowed to join. [2] The President said he was forced to resort to the constitutional
process in order to protect this institution because "activist" judges were seeking to redefine
marriage without regard to the voice of the people. [3] One may agree or disagree with court
decisions that provide equality for gay couples--like the Massachusetts gay marriage decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health--but courts that act to foster equality are within their
authority and within accepted principles of constitutional democracy. [4]
The Federal Marriage Amendment ("FMA") was introduced in Congress on May 21, 2003.
[5] However, it was not until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the state must
grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples [6] that President Bush publicly endorsed the FMA
and Congress actively pushed to pass it. [7] In 2004, the House of Representatives failed to
approve the FMA, garnering less than the two-thirds vote required to pass. [8] Nevertheless,
those in favor of the FMA were in the clear majority by a vote of 227 to 186. [9] The Senate, in
contrast, voted to stop the debate on the FMA by a vote of 50 to 48. [10]
The fight is not over. The FMA was reintroduced in early 2005 after President Bush was
reelected. [11] Some Americans attribute President Bush's reelection to the same-sex marriage
controversy that divides the country, [12] citing the many states that have amended their
constitutions to deprive same-sex couples of the same right to marry as opposite-sex couples.
[13] In fact, immediately following the election, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a national
gay rights organization, announced a change in strategy to temper efforts to obtain marriage
rights in light of the dramatic backlash. [14]
Article V provides for amendments to the Constitution. [15] "Amendments" are generally
intended to provide sufficient flexibility such that a document will survive over time and adjust
to changing circumstances. [16] Thus, amendments to the Constitution should promote the
primary purposes of the Constitution and be consistent with three of the most basic principles
articulated in the original document--individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism. [17]
Although, currently, only the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that same-sex
couples have a state constitutional right to marry, the ability to enter into the marital relationship
is a very significant liberty interest, even if it does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional
right. [18] The FMA tramples upon basic notions of liberty and justice by expressly creating a
secondary class of citizens and depriving them of that fundamental interest to marry-- infringing
on both equality and liberty principles. Only one amendment in history, the Eighteenth
Amendment, limited the liberty interests of the people. [19] Needless to say, it also is the only
amendment to be repealed. [20] Moreover, while there have been several proposed amendments
that would have limited the rights or liberty interests of individuals, these amendments have
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uniformly failed. [21]
This Article will demonstrate that the FMA is not only strikingly similar to these
unsuccessful amendments that attempted to deprive citizens of fundamental interests and rights,
but is even more destructive of separation of powers and federalism principles. The FMA is
designed to overrule a state supreme court decision in which the court, as the sole protector of
minority interests, acted consistently with principles of individual rights to protect minority
interests. [22] While the constitutional amendment process is the only "check" on the power of
the judiciary to interpret the Constitution, the process should be used to overrule the courts only
in cases where the judiciary abuses its power or decides a case in a manner clearly inconsistent
with constitutional principles. [23]
History supports this view. The Constitution has been amended only four times to overturn
Court precedent. [24] Each time the amendment was in harmony with constitutional principles
and represented a proper exercise of the authority of the people as the ultimate sovereign to
correct a court decision inconsistent with these principles. In fact, the Supreme Court itself has
often suggested that the amendment process was the proper means of addressing the question
before it, because the Court noted that it did not have the authority to decide the question
properly. [25] In contrast, the FMA violates separation of powers principles by prematurely
overruling a state supreme court decision that is in harmony with our democratic constitutional
principles and depriving the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address the issue. [26]
Finally, the FMA flagrantly violates federalism principles by legislating in an area left
primarily to the states. The federal government is one of limited powers. The Constitution grants
the federal government no power over marriage; the states have the exclusive power to define
marriage within their territories. [27] Of course, the federal government has the power to protect
individual rights consistent with notions of due process and equal protection. [28] Thus, even in
an area left exclusively to the states, the federal government may legislate to protect individual
rights and establish a federal floor for such rights. However, the FMA deprives individuals of
significant liberty interests and establishes a federal ceiling on constitutional rights. [29] This
clearly violates federalism principles and forecloses the opportunity for progressive state
experimentation, an important aspect of our dual federal and state system. [30]
In sum, the FMA is itself constitutionally suspect and is more destructive, on balance, of the
three basic democratic constitutional principles than any amendment previously adopted or
proposed. The amendment violates every tenet of constitutional democracy by: (1) expressly
limiting the due process and equality interests of a minority group; (2) precluding the Supreme
Court from fulfilling its role as the protector of individual rights; and, (3) foreclosing the states
from experimenting with progressive laws designed to promote equality within an area uniquely
reserved to the state governments. By violating these tenets of constitutional democracy, the
FMA is unlike any other amendment in our history [31] and must be rejected.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses Article V of the Constitution and the limits
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placed on the constitutional amendment process, specifically, whether the Court may find an
amendment substantively unconstitutional or require that the people, through convention, adopt
amendments that infringe on individual liberties. Part III analyzes the Eighteenth Amendment
and proposed amendments that have historically threatened individual interests or rights, drawing
parallels with the FMA. Part IV analyzes the four amendments designed to overrule Supreme
Court decisions and contrasts these with the FMA to demonstrate that the use of the amendment
process here is inconsistent with these past amendments. Finally, Part V discusses how the FMA
flagrantly violates federalism principles by limiting individual liberties in an area left exclusively
to the states, thereby depriving the nation of the opportunity to experiment with progressive laws.
I. Constitutional Amendment
A. Limits on Constitutional Amendments
Article V of the Constitution grants Congress the power to propose an amendment to the
Constitution whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary; and such amendment
shall become valid when ratified by the Legislatures or Conventions of three-fourths of the states.
[32] While thousands of constitutional amendments have been proposed since the founding, only
seventeen amendments have been added to the original Bill of Rights. [33] The Constitution is
deemed a higher law than ordinary legislation; thus the amendment process requires a
super-majority consensus for passage by Congress and the states. The purpose of requiring a slow
and deliberate process is to limit the number of amendments to those that truly reflect the will of
the people. [34] James Madison explained that in a large republic "it [should be] less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."
[35] The "people" are granted the ultimate authority over government with the power to redefine
the scope of its power by modifying the document that establishes such power. [36]
Whether the Constitution provides for substantive limits on amendments is hotly debated.
[37] There are strong arguments that some substantive limitations do exist. [38] The word
"amendment" itself suggests limits. "[T]he power to 'amend' [does not] include the power to
'destroy."' [39] "Amendment" implies change to the original document that respects its
foundational principles, those "in harmony" with the "general spirit and purpose[s]" of the
original document. [40] Radical alteration to the foundational principles is not intended. [41] The
Constitution contains "'an inner unity' and a commitment to 'certain overarching principles and
fundamental decisions to which individual provisions are subordinate."' [42]
The preamble of the Constitution establishes the primary purposes of the Framers--to
maintain a union of independent states and secure justice and liberty for all individuals
throughout the nation. [43] The body of the Constitution creates a framework for government to
achieve these principles by defining a federal government of limited powers, dividing power
among three separate branches--the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary--and protecting
individuals from government abuse. [44]
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This framework is founded upon three substantive principles that define our constitutional
democracy: federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. These rights are more
important than the democratic procedures provided in Article V to secure them. [45] Thus, the
use of proper procedures to amend the Constitution in a manner that contradicts fundamental
constitutional principles should be invalid.
Nevertheless, the generally accepted legal view derived from the plain language of Article V
is that the Court has no authority to question the substance of constitutional amendments. If the
procedural requirements of Article V are properly followed, the amendment is valid. [46] The
reason for this is simple. The amendment process is the sole check on judicial power to interpret
the Constitution. Thus, if the judiciary could review the substance of constitutional amendments,
it would wield unchecked ultimate power. [47] This is particularly problematic because its
members are not elected but rather are appointed and serve for life. [48] The judiciary, in fact, is
designed to be counter-majoritarian and is not well-suited to express the will of the "majority."
[49] Therefore, it is generally understood that the Supreme Court has no power to determine the
content of the Constitution, but only the power to interpret that which the Constitution does
contain. [50]
The arguments supporting substantive limits on constitutional amendments are useful in
analyzing which amendments are constitutionally suspect, even if the Court would be unwilling
to enforce substantive limits. Thus, an amendment is constitutionally suspect when it is in direct
conflict with the governing principles embodied in the original constitution, for example when
the value at stake is both expressly embodied in its text and has strong ties to other constitutional
values. [51]
The express purposes of the Constitution "to form a more perfect union, establish justice . . .
and secure the blessings of liberty" [52] establish two fundamental principles necessary to our
constitutional system of democracy: the "union" of individual states and individual interests in
justice and liberty. Amendments that would effectively eliminate or destroy the states would be
invalid as there would no longer remain a "union." [53] Similarly, amendments that destroy
individual interests in liberty and justice would be invalid as incoherent and destructive to the
very purposes of establishing justice and securing liberty. It is unlikely that any single
amendment would eliminate the states or destroy all fundamental interests necessary to maintain
justice and liberty. Such dramatic "amendments" would likely be the result of a revolution. [54]
However, it is plausible to imagine successive amendments that would deprive the states of
sufficient legislative powers such that over time the states would cease to exist in any real sense,
having been deprived of their primary powers. [55] Moreover, one could imagine successive
amendments that chip away at individual liberty interests such that, over time, the people would
lack sufficient protections to maintain individual justice and liberty.
The FMA is constitutionally suspect. First, individual interests in liberty and equality are
expressly enumerated in the Constitution. [56] The United States Supreme Court has held that
marriage is a fundamental liberty right of the people. [57] The Court has not held that same-sex
-4-

couples have a right to marry: that is the debate. [58] Nevertheless, the FMA expressly creates an
unequal system that deprives only same-sex couples of the legal right to marry, which, even if
not a federal constitutional right to liberty, [59] is a significant liberty interest. Second, values of
liberty and equality, and specifically marriage, invoke other fundamental enumerated interests of
expression, assembly, and religion. [60] Third, the power to define marriage lies primarily with
the states. [61] Setting a national standard for marriage that denies individual liberty interests is a
move toward eliminating both state sovereignty and individual justice and liberty. In sum, the
FMA should be invalidated as it impinges upon the substantive limits of "amendment."
B. Constitutional Amendment by Convention
While it may be improper to give the judicial branch ultimate authority over the content of
the Constitution, no branch should have such authority alone. To give any one branch this
authority violates the basic structure of checks and balances. Rather, the people created our
constitutional democratic government during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and should
alone retain the ultimate authority to substantially alter the document in a manner that is
inconsistent with the basic principles defined therein. The people's will is expressed through
convention, not by votes of Congress or the state legislatures. "'[C]onstitutionalism has one
essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government' . . . written by a special assembly of
citizens and then submitted to the people for approval." [62] Only the people have the authority
to approve an amendment that limits the natural interests of the people themselves: the people,
not the government, are the ultimate sovereign. [63] This proposition is supported by analogy to
the Seventeenth Amendment, [64] and by state courts, scholars, and politicians throughout
history who have agreed with this view. [65]
The people elect representatives to the state and federal legislatures. Once elected, these
representatives form the "government" and are no longer truly the "people." The Seventeenth
Amendment exemplifies this understanding. The Constitution originally provided that "[t]he
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the
Legislatures thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one vote." [66] The Seventeenth
Amendment requires that senators be "elected by the people" of the state rather than "by the
Legislatures thereof." [67]
A primary reason for the election of senators by the state legislatures was to protect the
interests of the states directly. [68] Madison explained that because "[t]he Senate will be elected
absolutely and exclusively by the State Legislatures," it "will owe its existence more or less to the
favor of State governments . . . ." [69] Thus, the Senate stood as a defense to federal
encroachment upon states' rights [70] because the senators, since elected by the state legislatures
and not the people directly, would be dedicated to protecting their respective states. Implicit in
this rationale is that state legislatures, while representatives of the people, primarily protect the
interests of the State and only indirectly those of the people.
The people soon became dissatisfied with the indirect election of their federal senators. The
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primary justification was the populist and progressive sentiment that the Senate was an
aristocratic body, far removed from the people and unresponsive to their needs. [71]
Furthermore, the people felt intelligent enough to choose their own representatives. [72] The
predominant sentiment among the press, the states, and the legislators was that popular election
of senators would strengthen democracy and weaken elitism. [73] Giving the people power to
elect their senators directly was thus a victory for democratic forces.
State courts have recognized limits on the power of the government to amend their
constitutions. For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the Arkansas General
Assembly had no power to repeal any aspect of the Bill of Rights of the Arkansas Constitution.
[74] The court explained that the Bill of Rights derived from a British statute that declared the
true rights of the British subjects. The codification of citizens' rights operated as a limit on the
powers of the crown. [75] The court explained that the rights are sacred not only because of their
antiquity, but also because our forefathers obtained them as a result of the perpetual struggle for
freedom. [76] As part of the original state constitution, the Framers placed these rights beyond
the power of the general government to oppress the people. [77] Thus, only a convention of the
whole people, not the legislature, could amend the Arkansas Constitution to alter the sacred
rights of the people. [78] Similarly, at the federal level, if an amendment will alter sacred rights
of the people, the people, by convention, should amend the federal constitution, not the congress
and state legislatures.
Scholars have argued that use of the convention method for adoption and ratification is
necessary when the proposed amendment makes fundamental changes to the Constitution,
especially when the amendment will deprive the people of individual liberty interests. Elai Katz
explained his position in this way:
A convention called for the express purpose of amending the Constitution would reflect
the will of the people regarding the specific matter at hand better than legislatures that may
have been elected before the public became aware of the proposed amendment. While
delegates to the convention would be selected based on their position on a single issue, such
as the right to an abortion, legislators are rarely elected because of their views regarding a
single issue.
In the eighteenth century, conventions were considered to be the highest expression of
popular will; they embodied popular sovereignty . . . . Thus, in the eyes of eighteenth century
society and possibly present society, a special convention, convened for the purpose of
revising the fundamental law, would be the best substitute for an act of pure popular
sovereignty. Furthermore, conventions require a longer, more deliberative, and better
publicized process. Since constitutional conventions are not permanent, ordinary
organizations, their selection and debates are likely to be followed more carefully by the
public than regular congressional sessions. Finally, delegates to conventions are elected for
one particular issue--to support or propose an amendment; . . . It follows, then, that a
principle-altering amendment proposed and ratified by conventions is more legitimate than
the same amendment proposed by members of Congress who were not elected for the express
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purpose of making particular changes to the fundamental law. [79]
Furthermore, throughout history, politicians have argued that the use of conventions for
approving and ratifying fundamental changes to our Constitution is necessary. For example,
President Abraham Lincoln stated that a constitutional amendment that could potentially alter the
"character of the Constitution," should be adopted by convention because "it allows amendments
to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take, or reject,
propositions, originated by others." [80]
However, the plain text of the Constitution enumerates four procedures for constitutional
amendment [81] and thus far the Supreme Court has held all methods equal. [82] For example, in
Sprague, the Court found that the Tenth Amendment did not require state conventions for
ratification of amendments affecting the liberty of citizens. [83] The Court held that the Tenth
Amendment reserves powers that are not granted to the federal government to the states or the
people to protect federalism principles, not individual rights. [84]
Interestingly, Ely Hart has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment may grant courts the
power to require selection of a specific procedure to amend the Constitution under certain
circumstances. Hart's vision of a representative democracy invokes two features: broad
participation of the people in the political process and protection of discrete minorities. [85]
According to Hart, the Founders understood the duty of representatives to govern in the interest
of the whole people. Representatives could not, therefore, refuse to represent a particular group.
[86] Under this theory, the Supreme Court has a right to review the states' Article V activities to
make sure that they comport with the Fourteenth Amendment. [87] Thus, the ratification process
used by a state may fall short of Fourteenth Amendment standards, for instance, if the legislators
did not adhere to their duty of representation. [88]
The arguments detailing the need for popular approval by convention when an amendment
infringes fundamental interests suggests that the FMA should be ratified, if at all, by convention.
The FMA limits natural interests that the people have in liberty, freedom, and equality, thus only
the people by convention, should have the authority to approve it, as they, not the government,
are the ultimate sovereign. [89]
Moreover, because a constitutional amendment is by far the most important and substantial
legal step this country can take, it should be taken only after serious unbiased consideration and
reflection by the electorate. A controversial amendment proposed in a time of political unrest is
unlikely to withstand the test of time. Citizens will become dissatisfied with such an amendment
once they have an opportunity to reflect upon it, [90] as demonstrated by the Eighteenth
Amendment. [91] The FMA was introduced at a time when this country was at war, having been
attacked by terrorists, and in the midst of a presidential election. Support for the amendment was
fueled by the political fervor of an election where candidates capitalized on the irrational fears
and prejudices of the electorate to create a divided polity and gain votes. [92] This is not an
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appropriate environment for proposing a controversial constitutional amendment since the people
have little opportunity in such a environment to reflect carefully on the ramifications of the
amendment.
II. Amendments and Individual Rights
Independent of the procedural requirements of constitutional amendment, the FMA, unlike
any other amendment in our history, substantively violates the basic tenets of our constitutional
democracy: individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism principles. The Bill of Rights,
[93] and later Amendments adopted by this nation, enumerate fundamental rights and protect
these rights from undue government infringement. The Ninth Amendment further protects
non-enumerated rights by stating that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." [94] The right to
"liberty" and the right to "equal protection" under the laws are granted expressly to the people
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [95] and reflect the very principles upon which this
nation was founded.
The debate over same-sex marriage raises individual interests in both fundamental rights: (1)
"liberty"--the right for same-sex couples to have the state recognize a committed monogamous
relationship between two individuals and bestow the benefits and obligations of this civil
institution upon them; and (2) "equality"--the right for same-sex couples to be eligible for the
same benefits and recognition as opposite-sex couples who agree to abide by the obligations
imposed by the civil institution of marriage. Amending the federal Constitution to define
marriage as between a man and a woman deprives same-sex couples the ability to marry and is
antithetical to principles of liberty and equality. Granted, same-sex couples currently have no
federal constitutional right to marry but the interest in marriage is an extremely important, if not
fundamental, one.
A. The Repealed Eighteenth Amendment
Only one amendment, the Eighteenth, deprived individuals of a liberty interest. The
Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within the United States. [96] Needless to say, it is the only constitutional amendment to be
repealed. [97] The Eighteenth Amendment grew out of the efforts of the temperance movement,
primarily motivated by religious Christian groups. Temperance urged moderation in the
consumption of alcohol so as to reduce its corrupting influence on public and private morals.
[98]
The struggle to prohibit alcoholic consumption first targeted the states. [99] In fact, the
federal courts limited the scope of certain state prohibition laws to protect Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce. [100] By 1912, however, nearly half the states had adopted
prohibition laws. [101] In 1914, the movement took the struggle to the national level, proposing a
federal constitutional amendment to prohibit the sale and transportation of alcohol nationwide.
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[102] The amendment was ultimately ratified by the states in 1919, primarily in reaction to
World War I. [103] Food shortages had led to conservation and prohibitionists argued that
alcohol led to the waste of precious resources. [104] Further, anti-German sentiment was
directed, in part, at the brewery industry, which was largely run by those of German descent.
[105]
After adoption, the Eighteenth Amendment suffered from several problems. [106] These
problems have been explained as a result of an amendment passed by a small, yet highly
organized and passionate interest group. [107] Because the Eighteenth Amendment did not
appear to reflect true popular sentiment, people were not willing to voluntarily conform to the
law and enforcement was very difficult. [108] Moreover, organized crime stepped in to meet the
popular demand [109] and drinking, in fact, increased among portions of the polity. For example,
women, who had been banned previously from saloons under state law, drank in newly
established venues for alcoholic consumption. [110]
The Eighteenth Amendment was criticized by reform movement organizations arguing the
amendment "promoted hypocrisy, encouraged law breaking, destroyed the balance of power
between state and federal authority, and impaired individual rights." [111] These groups claimed
that the amendment advanced unsupported social views and invaded the states' sphere of power.
The reformers perceived prohibition as a direct threat to state authority and local autonomy.
[112] Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey of Texas thought that proposing a national solution to a
social problem set dangerous precedent. Bailey worried that such a proposal would lead to
national marriage laws, which would ultimately erase state lines and subvert the republic. [113]
Interestingly, the amendment drafters attempted to limit the threat to federalism principles
and individual rights by allowing for concurrent state and federal enforcement of the laws and
not outlawing the personal use of alcohol. [114] While the interpretation of "concurrent powers"
was controversial, the Court settled the meaning by holding that, while states could not pass laws
that conflicted with the federal amendment, there was no requirement for them to enact
supplemental prohibition codes. [115] Moreover, strong beliefs in personal liberty and the
sanctity of the home supported leaving the personal use of alcohol unaffected by the amendment.
[116]
The parallels between the FMA and the Eighteenth Amendment are striking. First, the
movement to outlaw same-sex marriage nationwide is primarily led by conservative politicians
and Christian religious groups. Like the Eighteenth Amendment, the FMA is meant to protect the
"morality" of our society. [117] Admittedly, the marriage amendment is more popular with the
polity than was prohibition [118] This is not surprising since it affects only a small subgroup of
the citizenry, a subgroup that has long suffered prejudice by the majority. Second, both
amendments establish a national solution to a social problem over which there is no clear
agreement. Rather than allow the states to deal with the issue separately as contemplated by the
Constitution, the FMA imposes a uniform law on all states without any "concurrent" powers
granted to the states. In fact, the marriage amendment is more intrusive of state powers than the
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Eighteenth Amendment. Whereas the interstate commerce clause grants power to Congress to
regulate sales and transportation of alcohol across state lines, there is no similar Congressional
power over domestic relations. In fact, Senator Bailey's concern raised at the time of the
Eighteenth Amendment has been realized--the FMA is a national marriage law!
Third, as to personal liberty, the FMA is far more intrusive than the Eighteenth Amendment.
Citizens do not have a fundamental right to consume alcohol. [119] In fact, the liberty interest in
consuming alcohol is relatively insignificant. Yet the Eighteenth Amendment left personal use
unaffected in order to protect personal liberty interests. The Court has held, however, that
citizens do have a fundamental right to marry. [120] The FMA defines a class of unpopular
individuals and deprives them of the ability to marry another of the same sex. Although same-sex
marriage may not rise to a fundamental federal constitutional right, it certainly raises a
fundamental interest more important than the interest to consume alcohol.
Finally, while support for the Eighteenth Amendment was largely fueled by hatred for and
prejudice against German descendants, it did not target Germans or German descendants
specifically. Likewise, the marriage amendment is likely to be largely fueled by prejudice against
gay Americans. [121] The FMA is far worse than the Eighteenth Amendment, however, because
it specifically targets a discrete subgroup, expressly drafting prejudice in the Constitution.
B. The Proposed Anti-Miscegenation Amendment
There have been several proposed amendments that would have deprived individuals of
fundamental constitutional rights or interests; however, no other amendment so flagrantly
violates all three basic tenets of our constitution as does the FMA. [122] The most direct parallel
with the marriage amendment was the proposed anti-miscegenation amendment. For many years,
states outlawed marriage between individuals of different races through anti-miscegenation
statutes. [123] Nevertheless, early in the twentieth century, a renowned black boxer named Jack
Johnson garnered much publicity when he married a white woman, Lucille Cameron. [124] The
thought of "a brutal African prizefighter" marrying a white woman enraged Congressman
Seaborn Roddenberry of Georgia so much that he proposed a constitutional amendment
prohibiting interracial marriages. [125] Roddenberry believed that his amendment was necessary
to protect white women because "[n]o more voracious parasite ever sucked at the heart of pure
society, innocent girlhood, or Caucasian motherhood than the one which welcomes and
recognizes the sacred ties of wedlock between Africa and America." [126] White Americans
lacked the enthusiasm to enact the amendment, and the amendment garnered little support among
the black community. [127] The amendment proposed to ban interracial marriage was never
enacted into law.
The parallels with the FMA are obvious. The FMA seeks to deprive same-sex couples from
marrying in the same manner that the anti-miscegenation amendment sought to deprive
individuals of different races from marrying. The support for both amendments is grounded in
prejudice and infringes upon the states' power to define marriage, a state institution. [128] At the
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time the anti-miscegenation amendment failed, the Court had not yet held that interracial couples
had a constitutional right to marry. Instead, the states were left to legislate independently. Several
decades later, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia held that interracial couples have a
constitutional right to marry. [129] Therefore, the FMA also must fail so that the states may
retain the freedom to legislate independently, and allow the U.S. Supreme Court to ultimately
resolve the debate concerning the individual liberty interests of this minority group.
C. The Proposed Anti-Divorce Amendment
The Progressive era bore another social reform movement to change the divorce laws
throughout the nation. [130] This movement shared many of the same characteristics of the
prohibition movement. [131] In fact, just as the prohibition movement divided society in its time,
the issue of divorce created two conflicting movements: one seeking to restrict divorce and one
seeking to make divorce more accessible. [132] The traditionalists saw divorce as "an attack on
the sacred nature of marriage" and believed that, by making the practice of divorce more difficult,
they would be protecting the morality of people. [133] On the other hand, more liberal states
expanded upon the grounds for divorce. [134] Due to variations among the states about the
acceptable grounds for divorce, however, citizens of a more restrictive state would often migrate
to a state with more open divorce laws. [135] The ability of citizens to escape the restrictive
divorce law states prompted the divorce reform movement which portrayed divorce as "a danger
to American civilization." [136] One notable reformer, Theodore Woolsey, the first chief officer
of the New England Divorce Reform League and former president of Yale University, "compared
the U.S. to Rome and warned that the nation would repeat the empire's fate if it continued to
allow 'connubial unfaithfulness and divorce' to increase. Keeping 'family life pure and simple'
was the key to preserving the nation's 'present political forms."' [137]
The reformers introduced the first constitutional amendment in 1884 which resurfaced for the
next sixty years although it never passed. [138] Congress was worried about the consequences of
allowing the federal government to have authority over marriage relations. [139] Moreover, it
was particularly difficult to build a national consensus about what grounds would be proper for
granting divorce. The Supreme Court mostly stayed out of the issue of divorce except for
allowing the states broad latitude in refusing to accept out-of-state divorces. [140] Although this
led to uncertainty, it also led to a proliferation of divorce-mill jurisdictions and, with these
jurisdictions available, the movement remained divided and never succeeded in making divorce a
national issue. [141]
The parallels with the FMA are apparent. Similar constituencies are claiming the need to
protect the institution of marriage and the nation from moral destruction by adopting a federal
solution to a state problem about which individuals disagree. The marriage amendment, however,
is more egregious in that it targets only a small minority of citizens, unlike the divorce
amendment that would have limited all citizens from seeking divorce. Ironically, if saving
marriage is the real concern, it seems much more threatening to the marital institution to allow
couples to exit easily than it is to allow more couples to enter.
-11-

Moreover, this issue of migratory marriage is likely to be more threatening to the
conservative "moral majority," than were migratory divorces at the time of the anti-divorce
amendment. This is because the recognition of same-sex couples, even if only by certain states,
signals acceptance of homosexual conduct, a concept still repugnant to many people today. For
sixty years the Congress was unwilling to expand federal authority over marital relations by
setting a national standard for divorce. A principled consistency would inevitably dictate a
congressional refusal to expand federal authority over marital relations when the object is to
deprive individuals the ability to marry.
D. The Proposed Corwin Amendment
A third proposed amendment that violated principles of liberty and equality was the Corwin
Amendment. [142] The amendment read: "No Amendment shall be made to the Constitution
which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with
the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of
that State." [143] Thankfully, we can look back with the knowledge that the amendment was not
enacted (although the Civil War did follow), and today likely all would agree that such an
amendment would be considered despicable. [144] However, at the time of the proposed
amendment, such an argument was not so apparent. [145]
First, slavery was consistent with the text of the Constitution as it was understood at its
adoption and throughout the 1800s. Jefferson himself, at the time of the founding, acknowledged
that slavery was protected under the Constitution [146] and while sentiments had changed over
time, there still existed a strong commitment among several states to uphold the rights of
slaveholders. President Lincoln, who opposed slavery on moral grounds and opposed extending
it to new territories, "had never opposed its maintenance in those jurisdictions where it already
existed." [147] In his First Inaugural Address, he commented on the then pending Corwin
Amendment. He stated that he did not object to making explicit that the individual states possess
control over their domestic institutions, exclusive of federal interference, that he did not object to
such a provision being made irrevocable, and that such a provision was probably unnecessary
inasmuch as it was already then "implied constitutional law." [148]
Second, while the language of the amendment referenced state "domestic policy," slavery was
a business. Slave holders argued that slaves were rightfully their property. [149] It follows then,
at least under today's interpretation, that because the property interests substantially affect
interstate commerce, it would be appropriate for the federal government to legislate in this area
pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause powers. [150]
Third, although the amendment clearly violated individual rights, the individuals affected
were not then considered citizens of the United States. [151] Fourth, the amendment did comport
with basic federalism principles. It did not require all states to conform to one standard, to adopt
or reject slavery. Instead it protected the states from federal interference in their domestic affairs,
allowing the states to decide how to treat slavery within their borders. Finally, the amendment
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was consistent with Court doctrine of the day, which upheld slavery, and thus was not an attempt
to usurp judicial authority or violate separation of powers principles. [152]
In contrast to the proposed marriage amendment, even the Corwin Amendment--a proposal
that we today recognize as deplorable--would have been less destructive of fundamental
constitutional principles than the FMA. First, the Constitution is silent on the issue of marriages
and therefore it is a power left to the states (and the people), even though at the time of the
constitutional convention, same-sex marriages were not contemplated. By contrast, slavery was
generally accepted by the Framers and was, in fact, protected by the Constitution. [153] Second,
the FMA legislates in an area uniquely left to the states, whereas the Corwin Amendment
targeted domestic affairs involving property rights and thus could arguably fall within the federal
commerce power. [154] Third, the FMA specifically targets and deprives U.S. citizens of their
interests in liberty and equality, unlike the Corwin Amendment that targeted non-citizens. [155]
Fourth, the FMA violates federalism principles by binding all states to one national standard. The
Corwin Amendment, on the other hand, limited federal power to interfere with the states and
allowed them to make their own decision regarding slavery. Finally, the marriage amendment is
fueled by a desire to overturn state judicial precedent expanding individual rights to marry,
whereas the Corwin Amendment was consistent with judicial precedent of its day. [156]
Like our modern-day reaction to the Corwin Amendment, it is likely that years from now, our
descendants will read about the marriage amendment and be equally surprised and saddened at
how an enlightened society could consider drafting such prejudice into such a cherished
document, violating the three basic principles for which the Constitution stands.
E. The Proposed Flag-Burning Amendment
One other proposed amendment that continues to severely threaten individual rights is the
flag-burning amendment, [157] designed to overrule two Supreme Court decisions, Texas v.
Johnson [158] and United States v. Eichman. [159] In Johnson, the Court reversed the conviction
of an individual prosecuted under the Texas flag-desecration statute as a violation of his first
amendment right to free speech. [160] In Eichman, the Court invalidated Congress's Flag
Protection Act as an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. [161] The flag-burning amendment
would grant to Congress the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the U.S. flag. [162]
The Court has held that even if the desecration of the flag is offensive to a majority of citizens,
[163] it is also a powerful tool of expression. [164] Moreover, free expression is a fundamental
principle embodied in the Bill of Rights and thus trumps the government's interest in enforcing
the moral beliefs of the majority. [165] Justice Kennedy commented that the Court must,
occasionally, make a decision that it does not necessarily "like" in order to uphold the basic
principles underlying the Constitution. [166]
The flag-burning amendment has not yet been approved by both houses of Congress,
although it has come very close and in fact was recently passed by the House of Representatives
again. [167] Scholars criticize the proposed amendment as clearly in conflict with the express
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language of the First Amendment. [168] Furthermore, critics contend that the flag-burning
amendment is overly vague, invites unlimited prosecutorial discretion in its application, abridges
religious liberty along with free speech, and, ironically, would be ineffective in stopping flag
burning as a political protest. [169]
Again, it is productive to compare the flag-burning amendment and the FMA. First, these two
amendments are similar in that they both seek to restrict freedoms that are considered
fundamental: the freedom of speech and the freedom to marry. Just like the flag-burning
amendment infringes upon the right to speech, which lies as the bedrock of our democracy, [170]
the FMA is inconsistent with principles of liberty and equality. It is debatable whether the FMA
actually infringes individual rights to liberty and equality because the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on whether same-sex couples have a right to marry. [171] However, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has already so decided. [172]
Even though the flag-burning amendment and the FMA are similar in one respect, in many
others the flag-burning amendment would actually be less destructive of individual liberty
interests than the FMA. First, the flag-burning amendment restricts speech in a limited manner.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to free speech is not absolute; certain types of speech
are not protected, such as obscenity, [173] defamation, [174] and fighting words. [175] While the
flag-burning amendment would limit citizens' free speech, it would do so in a relatively discrete
fashion by targeting speech most citizens reject as unworthy of protection. [176] This is similar
to other classes of unprotected speech. In contrast, the FMA completely deprives same-sex
couples of the ability to marry and thus is arguably more destructive of an individual interest than
the flag-burning amendment. [177] Second, while the flag burning amendment only affects
individuals wanting to criticize the government by burning the flag, it does not expressly target a
discrete and discernable class of individuals. In contrast, the FMA targets same-sex couples, gay
Americans, a class that has long suffered bias and prejudice from the majority. [178] Finally,
state interests are not seriously infringed by the flag-burning amendment since it protects a
federal interest. In contrast, the marriage amendment deprives states of the right to establish
marriage laws by establishing a national definition of marriage.
III. Amendments and Separation of Powers: Amendments Overruling Supreme Court
Decisions
The FMA defies separation of powers principles. The Framers established three branches of
government and provided for appropriate checks and balances such that no branch may assume
centralized power and threaten the delicate balance created. [179] The legislative branch is
granted the power to enact laws. [180] The President is granted the power to enforce those laws.
[181] The judiciary is granted the power to adjudicate cases and controversies. [182] The
judiciary is the primary protector of individual rights, and the sole protector of the rights of the
"minority." [183] This branch is devoted to fairness, respect, and dignity for the individual and
makes decisions "based on normative and practical moral reasoning." [184] Since 1803, the
Supreme Court has been deemed the final interpreter of the Constitution with the ability to
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review laws enacted by the legislature to ensure they are consistent with constitutional principles.
[185]
Because the judicial branch has the ultimate authority over constitutional interpretation and
construction, the only "check" on judicial power of constitutional interpretation is the
constitutional amendment process. The amendment process should be used to overturn the Court
only when it acts beyond its powers or inconsistently with constitutional principles. Otherwise,
the careful balance of powers among the branches is compromised.
The history of amending the Constitution to overrule Supreme Court decisions is consistent
with this view and is particularly relevant here. While the U.S. Supreme Court is not being
overturned by the FMA, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's Goodridge decision is in
jeopardy. Goodridge was the catalyst for the fervor behind the proposed marriage amendment.
Moreover, the FMA will forever prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from addressing the issue.
Only four constitutional amendments have been adopted to overrule the Supreme Court.
[186] They are: (1) the Eleventh Amendment, which overruled Chisolm v. Georgia; [187] (2) the
Thirteenth Amendment and, most specifically, the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment,
[188] which overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford; [189] (3) the Sixteenth Amendment, which
overruled Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.; [190] and (4) the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
which overruled Oregon v. Mitchell. [191] As we will see, each amendment was in harmony
with the basic principles that underlie the Constitution--individual rights, separation of powers,
and federalism. Moreover, in the cases where fundamental liberty interests were at stake, the
amendment reestablished individual rights in light of the Court's limited interpretation of those
rights. Without analyzing the propriety of the individual Supreme Court decisions, the following
will demonstrate that, unlike the FMA, the use of the amendment power to overrule these cases
was proper and consistent with basic democratic principles.
First, in Chisolm, the Court was called upon to interpret the scope of its own jurisdictional
power "extend[ing] . . . to Controversies between two or more States;" [192] specifically,
whether such power authorized suits against a State by a private citizen of another State. [193]
The Court held it had such power. [194] The anti-federalists were outraged by this decision,
viewing it as a direct threat to state sovereignty. [195] Four years later the Senate introduced the
Eleventh Amendment to reverse the decision. [196] The Eleventh Amendment was a proper use
of constitutional amendment procedures to reign in the Court. In Chisolm, the Court broadly
interpreted its own authority pursuant to Article III in finding that federal courts had jurisdiction
to adjudicate cases brought by individuals against a state. A decision by one branch to broadly
construe its own powers [197] is problematic and thus using the amendment process to reign in
the Court's authority is consistent with separation of powers principles. Moreover, the Court's
decision directly threatened state sovereignty by allowing federal courts to entertain suits by
individuals against the state itself. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment's restraint of federal judicial
power over the states enforced federalism principles.
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In contrast, the FMA is designed to overrule the Goodridge decision which expanded the
rights of individual citizens as against the state legislature; Goodridge did not expand directly the
court's jurisdiction. Of course, by finding a statute unconstitutional the court is trumping the
legislatures' prerogative and thus arguably does threaten the delicate balance between the
judiciary and the legislature. However, as the protector of individual rights as against an
overreaching government, this is an appropriate function of the judiciary. The FMA not only
limits the rights of individuals and replaces the court's judgment with that of the legislature,
effectively expanding legislative authority and the delicate balance among the branches, it
threatens state sovereignty by setting a national standard in an area exclusively retained by the
states and is inconsistent with federalism principles.
Second, in Dred Scott, the Court held that a federal court in Missouri had no jurisdiction to
hear Scott's suit to win his freedom because Scott, as a slave, was not a citizen of the United
States, as "citizen" was understood at the time the Constitution was ratified. [198] Chief Justice
Taney labored to explain that there was no way to read the Constitution to interpret
African-Americans as citizens, largely because many founders themselves were slave holders.
[199] The Court tirelessly canvassed the history of blacks brought to this country as slaves and
the views of the "people" toward the slaves during colonial times, at the adoption of the
Constitution, and during the expansion of the territories. Justice Taney concluded that slaves
were never intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution. [200] He
explained that states or territories that outlawed slavery did so because slaves were ill-suited to
the local economies and not because the states or territories acknowledged a slave's personhood.
[201] The Court, however, invited an amendment to the Constitution stating:
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or
impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making
power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution . . . . If any of its
provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it
may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was
understood at the time of its adoption. [202]
Justice Charles P. Curtis resigned from the Court, in part because he believed that the opinion
had significantly damaged the Court's stature. [203] Others described Taney's opinion as "an
authorized registration of the political heresies of the dominant party of the day" and suggested
that the primary effect of Dred Scott would be the "loss of confidence in the sound judicial
integrity and strictly legal character" of the Court. [204]
As a precedent, Dred Scott was remarkably short-lived. In June, 1862, Congress abolished
slavery in all the federal territories. Edward Bates, President Abraham Lincoln's Attorney
General, issued an opinion late that year declaring that free men of color born in the United
States were citizens of the United States. Three years later the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were passed, obliterating the last vestiges of Dred Scott.
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The Dred Scott decision, perhaps one of the most notoriously "bad" decisions in the Court's
history, enshrined the denigration of an entire class of people, finding they were not citizens of
this country but rather the property of slave holders. While historically this may have been
consistent with the ideals of our ancestors, it clearly was a decision violating the fundamental
principles of human dignity, respect, liberty, and equality. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments corrected this error by abolishing slavery and granting slaves citizenship.
Interestingly, even the Court in Dred Scott recognized the Constitution was flawed in its
protection of slavery but felt itself bound by the document. [205] However, the Court suggested
that Congress amend the Constitution to correct for this problem. [206] Thus, the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments were not only consistent with principles of individual liberty and
equality, they were consistent with the Justices' desires, if not their "official" decision, and thus
did not seriously threaten separation of powers principles. Of course, the Thirteenth Amendment
removed the power of the states to allow slavery, and thus is inconsistent with the principle of
states' rights. However, the need to establish national standards to protect individual liberty
interests and dignity far outweigh federalism concerns in this situation. [207]
Third and similarly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which overruled Mitchell and extended
the right to vote to all citizens eighteen years or older, expanded individual rights, and infringed
slightly on the states' freedom to establish their own voting age standards. [208] In Mitchell, the
Justice Department, several states, and other interested parties challenged the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970 [209] that, among other things, lowered the minimum age of voters in both
state and federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen. [210] Many states refused to comply
with the Act on the basis that it "takes away from them the powers reserved to the States by the
Constitution to control their own elections." [211] The Court concluded that Congress could set
the age for voters for federal elections but could not dictate such requirements for state or local
elections. [212] The Court found that the Framers intended for the states to set their own voting
criteria for local and state elections as a means of maintaining a federalist structure of
government. [213] Because only three states passed laws to allow eighteen-year olds to vote in
state and local elections, Mitchell created dual voting age requirements in most all states. [214]
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment granting the right to all citizens eighteen years of age and older to
vote in all elections was proposed to remedy the anticipated confusion, fraud, and costly
administration of such a dual system. [215]
Whenever a federal constitutional amendment is designed to expand individual rights of
liberty and equal treatment under the law, thereby setting a new federal floor for individual
rights, the power of the state is confined. For this reason, the Court in Dred Scott and Mitchell, to
protect its legitimacy, refused to interpret individual rights expansively against the states with the
expectation that Congress, the states, or the people would act to "correct" its decisions and
expand individual rights through a more democratic process--constitutional amendment. It is
appropriate and consistent with democratic principles to set a new federal floor for individual
rights by a constitutional amendment overruling a Court decision in which the Court felt
restrained to expand those rights.
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By contrast, the FMA has the opposite effect. It sets a new federal ceiling for individual
rights nationwide in response to one state court expanding individual liberties. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court chose to interpret individual liberty interests more
expansively than the U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott or Mitchell, leaving itself open to
criticism of being "activist." [216] As a state court, interpreting the state constitution, and
affecting only its citizens, it is understandable why the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
would interpret individual rights more expansively than the U.S. Supreme Court, as its decision
affects only Massachusetts citizens.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge acted well within its own authority
as the final arbiter of its state constitution issuing a very thoughtful, well-supported, rational
decision, following the law, setting a policy founded on equality, and protecting the interest of
the minority. [217] The court held that the Massachusetts legislature has no legitimate interest in
denying two committed individuals a marriage license solely because they are of the same sex.
[218] In fact, the court found that such denial places same-sex families in jeopardy by depriving
the couples and their children important protections afforded opposite-sex couples. [219] As the
only institution devoted to protecting minority interests, its ruling protecting those interests does
not deserve to be overruled by constitutional amendment.
The FMA is an inappropriate use of the amendment power designed to prevent any other
state court and the U.S. Supreme Court from addressing this issue. Congress is limiting
individual interests through a constitutional amendment and substituting its judgment for the
courts' judgment. One could argue that the FMA does no more than codify the current state of the
law and thus does not affect liberty interests at all. Because the Court has not held that a federal
right to same-sex marriage exists (at least not yet), it is less of an affront on individual liberty
than if the amendment removed a right that the Court has already found to exist. Nevertheless,
general notions of liberty are broader than those found as rights in the Constitution; and the more
significant the interest at stake, the more suspect is an amendment denying that interest.
Furthermore, while it is true that, historically, marriage has been the union of a man and
woman, marriage has changed in many respects over time to accommodate evolving notions of
liberty and equality. [220] This evolution generally takes place in the courts as individuals assert
their interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. [221] By freezing the current state of the law
through a constitutional amendment, such evolution is impossible. Thus, the FMA redistributes
the powers of the three branches by denying the courts (as well as the states) the ability to decide
this issue.
Through amendment, the legislative branch has the power to enact laws that establish societal
standards only so long as the laws enacted do not violate the constitutional rights of individuals.
[222] The legislature is not empowered to draft laws to enshrine illegitimate prejudices of the
majority. Allowing the legislature, with the endorsement of the executive, to amend the
Constitution to expressly overrule a decision of the judiciary, which acted consistently with
democratic principles by protecting the rights of a minority of the people, destroys the delicate
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balance of power among the branches.
Finally, in Pollock, [223] the Court struck down an income tax amendment to the Wilson
Tariff Act adopted by Congress in 1894. [224] Designed to help solve the severe economic
troubles of the late nineteenth century, those who had opposed the income tax believed it to be
socialistic and hostile to free enterprise. [225] The Court held the income tax was not
apportioned and thus unconstitutional in violation of art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4 of the Constitution, which
limits Congress's power to impose a tax "unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken." [226] The Court stated that whether the income tax was
desirable or not was a question for the political branches and suggested that the political branches
amend the Constitution to allow for such a tax if politically desirable. [227] In the early twentieth
century, Congress followed the Court's suggestion and in 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment was
enacted, stating: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration." [228]
Unlike the income tax, same-sex marriage is not a political question better left to the
majoritarian branches. Rather, it presents a question of discrimination against a targeted minority,
the type of question expressly suited to the courts. The court in Goodridge, as the sole protector
of minority rights, protected the minority. The FMA is an illegitimate use of the constitutional
amendment process to overrule a court decision and threatens separation of powers principles.
IV. Amendments and Federalism
Federalism principles define the allocation of power between the federal and state
governments. The federal government is one of "limited" powers; the articles of the Constitution
enumerate those powers. [229] While certain powers lie within the exclusive domain of the
federal government, most of the enumerated powers are shared with the states. [230] The Tenth
Amendment reserves all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government to the states or
to the people. [231]
Federalism principles serve a very important function by allowing the experimentation of
developing ideals at the state level without affecting the entire union. [232] In this manner, "new"
ideals are tested before they are adopted nationwide or refuted, and individuals have the choice to
live in a state that protects the liberty interests important to them. [233] The states, of course,
may not reduce individual liberties below the floor established by the federal government, [234]
but they are free to expand upon them. [235] In fact, once there is sufficient "experimentation"
within the states, the federal government may step in and provide all citizens of the United States
the liberties granted by the "experimenting" states by establishing a new federal floor for
individual rights. [236]
An amendment that infringes on fundamental state powers is highly destructive of state
sovereignty and inconsistent with federalism principles. Domestic relations are traditionally an
exclusive state power. [237] The authority to define "marriage" falls exclusively with the states
-19-

as perhaps the most central aspect of domestic relations. [238] The Constitution grants no power
to the federal government to define marriage or grant marriage licenses to the people. State civil
marriage is exactly that, a state (not federal) civil (not religious) institution. All couples are
married pursuant to state authority, and the federal government merely agrees to acknowledge
those marriages for federal purposes. [239] Moreover, while there are separate institutions for
religious marriage, civil institutions are not dependent upon, nor should they be influenced by,
religious tenets. [240]
The FMA would force all states to define marriage as the union of a man and a woman;
depriving any state of the ability to deviate from that definition independent of the state's interest
or policy. This power is outside the scope of any existing power granted to the federal
government. Because the FMA is designed to limit rather than protect individual liberties, the use
of federal power here is illegitimate and infringes upon a fundamental power of the states.
Moreover, by trumping state authority in this way, the benefit of having states experiment with
new laws is nullified. [241]
A. State Experimentation
States have experimented with the definition of marriage over the years, demonstrating the
usefulness of such experimentation. The most obvious parallel to the same-sex marriage debate is
the history of anti-miscegenation statutes in this country. Long ago citizens began challenging
state anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed the marriage between individuals of different
races. [242] In 1852, Maine became one of the first states to uphold the constitutionality of an
anti-miscegenation statute and declare interracial marriages null and void. [243] It was not until
1948 that California became the first state to declare its anti-miscegenation statute
unconstitutional. [244] During the next twenty years, cases were brought in other states
challenging similar anti-miscegenation statutes and several successfully invalidated them. [245]
However, it was not until 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia that no
state could deny two people a marriage license merely because they were of different races. The
Court held that this denial violated federal constitutional principles of liberty and equality. [246]
Loving thus set a new federal floor for individual rights throughout the nation. Interestingly,
these events never would have transpired had the proposed anti-miscegenation amendment been
ratified. [247]
A similar history with regard to same-sex marriage is developing in our lifetime. The very
first challenge to state marriage laws that deprived same-sex couples of a right to marry was
brought in Minnesota. [248] In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the challenge and
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal. [249] For many years, same-sex couples
challenged similar statutes in other states and lost. [250]
However, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that denying same-sex couples a right
to marry amounted to sex-based discrimination and violated the Equal Rights Amendment of the
Hawaii Constitution unless the state could justify the discriminatory treatment. [251] On remand,
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the Hawaii trial judge found that the state failed to justify the discriminatory treatment and held
the state statute violated the equal rights of same-sex partners. [252] The case was appealed to
the Supreme Court of Hawaii for a second time [253] and, while on appeal, the state legislature
passed two laws: (1) a Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act--granting couples ineligible to marry, certain
basic benefits, [254] and (2) a proposed constitutional amendment stating that the Hawaii
legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples. [255] In 1998, the
citizens of Hawaii approved the state constitutional amendment. [256]
Meanwhile, same-sex couples in the state of Vermont were challenging the Vermont
marriage laws, which denied same-sex couples marriage licenses. The challengers argued that the
Vermont marriage laws violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.
[257] In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and held that same-sex couples in Vermont
are entitled to the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married
opposite-sex partners. [258] The Court did not find that the denial of a marriage license violated
the constitution but rather the denial of the benefits associated with a marriage license did. [259]
The court instructed the Vermont legislature to craft an appropriate means for granting the same
marital benefits to same-sex couples as enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. [260] In April 2000, the
Vermont Legislature created civil unions for such couples. [261]
The Goodridge decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in November, 2003 is the most
recent attempt by a state appellate court to expand the rights of same-sex couples. [262] That
court held that same-sex couples have a right to marry (not just a right to benefits), and that any
separate but equal solution would be unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution.
[263] In other words, the court held that a civil union recognizing same-sex couples and granting
identical benefits is not constitutionally adequate in Massachusetts. [264] The court directed the
Massachusetts legislature to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on May 17,
2004. [265] The Governor of Massachusetts requested a stay from the Court while the legislature
attempted to pass an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, but the request was not
granted. [266] The first same-sex couples were married in Massachusetts on May 17, 2004. [267]
When the federal government attempts to step in and cut-off the debate among the states, by
setting a federal ceiling on individual rights nationwide, it destroys a central purpose of our dual
state and federal system and, worse, enshrines inequality and prejudice into our Constitution.
[268]
B. Protecting States from Activist Sister States
The federal government has an interest in protecting the states from each other. In other
words, each state is a separate sovereign, and no state can infringe the sovereignty of the other
states. [269] The proponents of the marriage amendment claim there is a legitimate need to
amend the federal constitution to protect states from the "activist" judges of other states, like
those in Massachusetts. They also argue that to allow individual states to issue marriage licenses
to same-sex couples will place all other states in the position of having to recognize those
marriages and to grant benefits to the couples in violation of their public policy. [270]
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This claim is misleading and unrealistic. The Goodridge decision and the marriage licenses
granted in Massachusetts affect no other state nor the federal government directly. [271] Albeit
indirectly, each state's laws affect every other state and the federal government.
The Full Faith and Credit ("FF&C") Clause of the Constitution defines the credit that each
state must grant to other states' legal acts and protects the states from overreaching sister states.
[272] The FF&C Clause was drafted to reconcile the desire for diversity among the states with
mutual respect for differences of opinion. [273] While the clause states that each state must give
FF&C to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the other states, [274] it is not
absolute. The Supreme Court recognizes various exceptions to the generalized requirement of
mutual respect, most notably when recognizing a judgment by a sister state that the home state
finds fundamentally objectionable. [275] In fact, it was common during the period when the
anti-miscegenation statutes were being challenged for states not to recognize interracial
marriages granted in other states on the basis that those marriages were odious, against the will of
God and public policy, and an attempt by citizens to avoid their home state's restrictive marriage
laws. [276] Thus, there is precedent to support the idea that states need not recognize same-sex
marriages granted in sister states if they are deemed contrary to that state's public policy. [277]
Moreover, the federal legislature has already acted to protect states from sister states that
have decided to permit same-sex marriages. In 1996, after the Hawaii Supreme Court decision on
same-sex marriage was announced, the federal government enacted the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") granting the states the power to refuse recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in
another state. [278] Many states followed suit and enacted their own statutes refusing to
recognize same-sex marriages. [279] These state statutes are designed to support states' claims,
under the FF&C Clause, that recognition of same-sex marriages would violate a fundamental
state policy interest.
There are strong arguments that the federal DOMA statute is unconstitutional. [280] The
primary argument for challenging DOMA is that the Act "is the antithesis of a full faith and
credit measure which lacks sufficient generality and, without adequate justification, encroaches
upon an area traditionally reserved for state regulation." [281] In mid-July 2004, the first suit
challenging a state's power to refuse recognition of a valid Massachusetts same-sex marriage was
filed in Florida. [282] The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that Florida's and the federal
government's refusal to recognize their Massachusetts marriage license violated their
fundamental rights of equal protection and due process, the FF&C Clause, the Privileges and
Immunities Clauses, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. [283] Although the
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, proponents of the FMA use the possible success of
such suits to strengthen their contention that the marriage amendment is necessary. If DOMA is
struck down as unconstitutional, it is incapable of protecting states from the acts of sister states.
However, even if DOMA were held unconstitutional, the FF&C clause arguably allows states to
decline to recognize marriages that are against their states' public policy, providing sufficient
protection to state sovereignty. [284]
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C. Protecting the Federal Government from Activist States
Although the federal government has no direct power over the marital institution, the federal
government recognizes state marriages and grants many federal benefits to spouses as defined by
state law. [285] Thus, the federal government does have an interest in the definition of
state-sanctioned marriages. DOMA was enacted to protect this federal interest by denying federal
recognition to same-sex marriages recognized in any state. [286] DOMA is arguably
unconstitutional as "the Act unreasonably restricts interstate travel and is motivated by a desire to
impose an undeserved burden on a disfavored group." [287] If found unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, a constitutional amendment is likely the only mechanism to overrule the Court's
finding.
The House, fearful of this possibility, voted to approve "The Marriage Protection Act of
2004," [288] which would strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to DOMA and
introduced the Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004, [289] to allow
Congress, if two thirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court
concerning the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. Opponents claim both statutes are
unconstitutional as a direct violation to the jurisdictional authority granted the federal courts by
the Constitution and in opposition to the centuries old Supreme Court case of Marbury v.
Madison [290] and Ex parte McCardle. [291]
In sum, amending the federal constitution to set a ceiling on individual liberty and equality
interests and to dictate to every state of the union that a marriage must be defined as between a
man and a woman infringes upon a power exclusively retained by the states. Moreover, it
prevents the states from serving their unique function of experimentation, and defies the principle
of federalism. The very same conservatives who rally for states' rights [292] when it suits their
political agenda now demand that all states treat gay citizens unfairly and inequitably. Moreover,
every attempt by Congress to achieve the same result short of a constitutional amendment is itself
arguably unconstitutional.
Conclusion
The U.S. Constitution is an amazing and versatile document and has served this country well
for over 200 years. The Constitution has been amended since its adoption, but successful
amendments have been consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and the Framers' purposes.
The FMA is not: the FMA is in direct conflict with fundamental principles for which our
democracy stands: individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism. Moreover, the FMA
will not protect the marital institution, instead it will enshrine bigotry and inequality in the
Constitution.
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motive was prejudice against gay americans. Paul Varnell, Changing Rhetoric on Gay Marriage,
Chicago Free Press, June 22, 2005, available at
http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/varnell/varnell157.html ("[O]ne of the most interesting
aspects of last year's Senate debate on the so-called Federal Marriage Amendment was the
relative absence of overt criticism of gays and lesbians and their relationships. Instead,
amendment supporters focused primarily on how the amendment would solidify the association
of parenthood with marriage and would benefit children by assuring them an optimal family of
two opposite sex parents."). However, motives may be unstated, especially if they would detract
from the message. See id. (Varnell suggests that the stated rationale is likely disingenuous stating
"[a]s Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) expressed it, however disingenuously, 'This amendment is not
about prejudice. It is about safeguarding the best environment for our children."'). Moreover, the
stated motives are not adequately supported. In this age of technology, there are a variety of ways
for couples to have children, a husband and wife are not necessary, and given that many gay
couples are parents, allowing gays to marry would not seriously detract from the purported
association of parenthood and marriage. Further, there is little, if any uncontroverted evidence
that children are necessarily benefited by opposite-sex parents. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996).
[122] During a brief review of a compilation of proposed amendments to the Constitution
between 1889 and 1929, no single amendment appears to violate all three basic tenets of
Constitutional democratic principles as flagrantly as the Federal Marriage Amendment. The
author grouped the proposed amendments into various categories. Those affecting the form of
government (focusing primarily on procedural changes, term changes, etc.), the powers of the
government (the most substantive of the proposed amendments, which focused on various
powers including war powers, federal taxation, question of aliens, territorial powers, etc.), and
the procedure of constitutional amendments (altering ratification procedures, time for ratification,
etc.). See Musmanno, supra note 31, at vii-x. Those that are most closely on point are those
involving marriage, divorce, miscegenation, and prohibition of polygamy. Id. at 104-08, 131-35;
see infra Parts II.B-C.
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[123] See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (noting the fifteen states, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisianna, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia, which still had anti-miscegenation statutes or
constitutional provisions in force in 1967 (citing Ala. Const. art. 4, § 102, Ala. Code tit. 14, §
360 (1958); Ark. Code Ann. §55-104 (1947); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Fla. Const.
art. 16, § 24, Fla. Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
402.020 (1966); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:79 (1950); Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263, Miss. Code Ann.
§ 459 (1956); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (1966); N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 8, N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-181 (1953); Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 12 (1965); S.C. Const. art. 3, § 33, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7
(1962); Tenn. Const. art. 11, § 14, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955); Tex. Penal Code Ann 492
(Vernon 1952); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961)).
[124] Denise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant Hero of the Black Community, 32 Akron L.
Rev. 529, 546 (1999).
[125] See id. at 549 n.78 (citing 69 Cong. Rec. 503 (1912) (statement of Rep. Roddenberry)
(stating "[t]hat intermarriage between negroes or persons of color and Caucasians or any other
character of persons with the United States... is forever prohibited.")).
[126] Morgan, supra note 124, at 549. However, because the amendment prohibited both
voluntary and coercive interracial relationships, it actually would have constrained a white
woman's free choice of sexual partners and further protected the white man's exclusive access to
them. Id.
[127] See id. at 550-51 (drawing upon the writings of W.E.B. DuBois to summarize the negative
opinion of this proposed amendment in the black community). DuBois wrote:
[T]hat anti-miscegenation legislation should be opposed, not because race had no
significance, but because such laws treated blackness as if it were a physical taint, because
sex out of wedlock was morally repugnant, and because such laws "leave the colored girl
absolutely helpless before the lust of white men."
Id. (quoting The Crisis, Feb. 1913, at 180).
[128] See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (holding that a state has an "absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation... shall be created."). But see
Gerard V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y
189, 207- 08 (2004) (concluding that the idea that states have control over the definition and
control of marriage is no longer accurate given recent Supreme Court decisions that limit states
and federal legislation meant to curtail the states' power in this area).
[129] See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (describing the decision of whether a
person wishes to marry a person of another race as being an individual one upon which the state
cannot infringe).
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[130] See Hamm, supra note 98, at 257 (contending that, even though it is generally thought
of as a regulationist reform movement, the divorce reform shared many characteristics with
progressive movements including the fact that it began in the 1880s and continued through the
progressive era).
[131] See id. (concluding that the supporters of both the divorce reform movement and the
prohibition movement "came from the same social background and shared fundamental
assumptions about society").
[132] See id. at 258 ("[b]efore the Civil War, two competing forces, a restrictive tradition that
virtually prohibited divorce and a popular desire for easier divorce, pulled the American polity in
different directions over the issue....").
[133] Id.
[134] See id. (citing cruelty, misconduct, or long imprisonment as some of the newly
accepted justifications for divorce in addition to adultery).
[135] See id. (classifying this practice as "migratory divorce"). Many western states such as
Indiana and Nevada were particularly popular for those seeking divorce. In fact, divorce lawyers
from these states opened offices in New York to facilitate this process. Id.
[136] Hamm, supra note 98, at 259.
[137] Id.
[138] See id. (noting that most of these proposals never even left committee).
[139] See id. (observing that southern congressmen in particular, despite support for
restricting the ability of married couples to divorce, were concerned that any federal legislation
on divorce would lead to federal legislation that legitimated interracial marriages). Furthermore,
these congressmen, based on the same fear of the legitimization of interracial marriages, argued
that a federal law without an amendment would be unconstitutional. Id.
[140] See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 605-06 (1906) (holding that a divorce that was
decreed in Connecticut when the wife was a citizen of New York does not need to necessarily be
recognized by the state of New York under the full faith and credit clause); see also Hamm, supra
note 98, at 260 (arguing that this approach produced mixed results since, in theory, as long as a
divorced couple did not try to remarry in a restrictive state, there was nothing that a state could
do to question whether a divorce in another state was recognized or not).
[141] See Hamm, supra note 98, at 260 (alleging that, because liberal jurisdictions had
created a type of tourist industry with the draw being their divorce laws and more conservative
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jurisdictions could preserve the strict divorce laws in their states, there was no way to come to a
national consensus on the issue).
[142] See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1992, 2046-47
(2003) (stating that the Corwin Amendment was the original language of the Thirteenth
Amendment prior to the start of the Civil War (citing Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1284
(1861)).
[143] Id.
[144] See id. at 2047 (describing how the Corwin Amendment was the only pre-Civil War
proposal dealing with the issue of slavery to pass both houses of Congress). Furthermore, the
amendment was signed by President Buchanan, supported by Abraham Lincoln, and sent to the
states for ratification. However, the compromise amendment was discarded once the Civil War
began. Id. at 2047-48.
[145] See generally A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and
"Irrevocable" Thirteenth Amendment, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 501, 512-34 (2003) (presenting
the historical context and the debate surrounding the Corwin Amendment and describing how
this amendment was really an attempt to prevent the secession that eventually occurred and led to
the Civil War).
[146] Brandon, supra note 51, at 233.
[147] Id. at 234.
[148] Id.
[149] See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1856) (summarizing the defendant's plea
which contains the allegations that, because the plaintiff was a "negro slave," he was the "lawful
property" of the defendant who therefore has a right to restrain him); see also Kaimipono David
Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 191, 239 (2003) (pointing out
that, in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, and other southern states,
property taxes on slaves constituted the largest portion of state property tax income).
[150] See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale L.J. 1119, 1176
(1995) (concluding that the formulation set forth in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)--where the Court held that Congress's commerce power allowed the Federal Government
to regulate the amount of wheat grown for personal use--would surely have placed slavery within
the reach of Congress's commerce power). But see Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, 505-06
(1841) (McLean, J., concurring) (concluding that the federal government had no power under
Article 1, § 8 to regulate the interstate trade of slaves, but rather states had the exclusive power to
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regulate the interstate slave trade).
[151] See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406 (holding that a former slave cannot be made a citizen of
Missouri or any other state and, therefore a former slave is not a citizen of the United States and
does not have the right to file suit in federal courts).
[152] See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1850) (holding that the laws of each
individual state, and not the laws of other states, determine whether one is a slave); see also
Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 215 (1836) (affirming that, although slavery
may be "contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, humanity and sound policy," slavery
is not contrary to the laws of the nation and thus states are bound to respect each other's slavery
laws).
[153] See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
[154] See supra note 150 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that, based on the more
modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause, federal regulation of slavery would have been
within Congress's powers).
[155] See supra note 151 (concluding, based on the Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott,
that former or current slaves were not considered U.S. citizens and did not have the rights and
privileges that arise from citizenship).
[156] See Strader, 51 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that state laws alone determine the status of
slavery and slaves and thus, once a lower court determines that a state law makes a person a
slave, "their judgment upon this point is... conclusive upon this court, and we have no
jurisdiction over it.").
[157] See H.R.J. Res. 10, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing the addition of an amendment to
the Constitution which would state, "[t]he Congress shall have power to prohibit the physical
desecration of the flag of the United States"); see also S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2005). The
House approved this language on June 22, 2005, by a vote of 286-130. 151 Cong. Rec. H4904,
H4927-28 (daily ed. June 22, 2005). As of publication, the bill is currently awaiting
consideration by the Senate.
[158] 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
[159] 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
[160] See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that neither the state's "interest in preserving the
flag as a symbol" nor its "interest in preventing breaches of the peace" justifies a criminal
conviction for burning the flag because it is an act of political expression).
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[161] See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319 ("Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very
freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering.").
[162] See supra note 157.
[163] See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318 (acknowledging that Congress purportedly found a
national consensus favoring prohibition on flag burning).
[164] See id. at 315 (observing that the government must, and in fact did, concede that
burning the flag constitutes expressive conduct).
[165] See id. at 318 (rejecting the idea that the government has greater flexibility in
suppressing speech as public opposition to that speech grows).
[166] See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing that this case is a rare time where it is appropriate to recognize personal distaste for
a result that is "right" according to the principles of the Constitution).
[167] See 151 Cong. Rec. H4904, H4927-28 (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (containing the most
recent House vote approving the flag-burning amendment by a vote of 296-130); see also Mike
Allen, House Passes Constitutional Amendment to Ban Flag Burning, Wash. Post, June 23, 2005,
at A5 (announcing that the flag-burning amendment was passed in the House of Representatives
on June 22, 2005). This was the fifth time that the amendment has passed the House and there is
a new chance that the amendment may pass in the Senate where it has narrowly been defeated
each of the previous four times. Id.
[168] See generally Rosen, supra note 63, at 1088-92 (concluding that the flag-burning
amendment was not only objectionable, but was actually unconstitutional because it would limit
otherwise inalienable rights); see also U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech....").
[169] See Isaacson, supra note 80, at 600 (arriving at the conclusion that the flag-burning
amendment would not only restrict freedom, but it would not accomplish its purpose). This
conclusion is reached through the reasoning that, because the legally appropriate method of
disposing of a torn or soiled flag is to burn it, all that a protester would have to do is find such a
flag to burn. Id. at 584-87.
[170] See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (stating that freedom of speech
is a fundamental personal right and liberty); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting that the Founding Fathers "believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth."); Tribe, supra note 36, at 785-89 (describing free speech as a "basic element of
our fundamental law" and outlining the basic elements of several theories which support the
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significance of free speech). These theories included the necessity of free speech in maintaining
the "marketplace of ideas," "self-government," and definition of personal and group identity. Id.
[171] But see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that, "[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.").
[172] See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
limiting marriage to only opposite-sex couples violates "the basic premises of individual liberty
and equality").
[173] See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (finding that the history
surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment rejects obscenity as "utterly without redeeming
social importance.").
[174] See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952) (observing that every state has
made libel a crime and, like other forms of speech not protected by the Constitution, it is "of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
[175] See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining "fighting
words" as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace.").
[176] But see Isaacson, supra note 80, at 563 (arguing that, because of the vagueness of the
term "desecration" and the undetermined scope of that word, the use of the word in the
amendment invites limitations on more forms of speech than contemplated).
[177] See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
[178] See Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (as originally
introduced, May 21, 2003) (proposing the initial language of the FMA).
The marriage amendment was first drafted as follows:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither
this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to
require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples
or groups.
Id. Not only would this language deprive same-sex couples of the right to marry but it
suggests that any status granted same-sex couples resembling marriage would be unconstitutional
as well. The language was then amended to read:
Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman. Neither
this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a
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woman.
Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004) (as amended, Sept. 23,
2004). This new language defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman but does not
prevent other recognition of same-sex couples. Thus, states are free to grant marital benefits to
same-sex couples, as Vermont has done, by creating civil unions or domestic partnerships. See
1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 847 (2000) (codified as Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2000))
(creating the institution of a civil union and defining civil unions as being between people of the
same sex who are otherwise excluded from marriage laws). Under the proposed amendment,
states can prevent same sex couples from marrying. The only difference is the name.
[179] See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("The men who met in Philadelphia in
the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle
of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny.").
[180] See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.");
see also Questions, supra note 3, at 211-12 (extolling the ability of the legislature to include a
large number of individuals and diverse people and thoughts into the lawmaking process, thus
maximizing democracy and accountability).
[181] See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America."); see also Questions, supra note 3, at 211 (emphasizing that the
individual serving as the executive represents the most efficient and rational way to achieve
certain objectives and policy outcomes).
[182] See U.S. Const. art. III.
[183] See Questions, supra note 3, at 218 (noting that the judiciary is "not intended to be
accountable to the people," but rather is the only branch that protects the interests of the minority
of the people from discrimination).
[184] Id. at 212.
[185] See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) ("[I]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Interestingly, several amendments to
the Constitution have been proposed to alter the Supreme Court's authority in this area; not one
has succeeded. Musmanno, supra note 31, at 92-95. Yet another arguably unconstitutional bill in
flagrant violation of Marbury was introduced in the House in 2004 to allow Congress, if two
thirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress. Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act
of 2004, H.R. 3920, 108 Cong. (2004).
[186] See Thomas Baker, Towards a "More Perfect Union": Some Thoughts on Amending
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the Constitution, 10 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 9 n.37 (2000) ("Three other amendments could be
understood to impliedly reject earlier Supreme Court understandings of the Constitution: The
Seventeenth Amendment (1913) (direct election of Senators); the Nineteenth Amendment (1920)
(women's suffrage); and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964) (abolition of poll taxes in federal
elections).").
[187] 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
[188] The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments are referred to as the Civil War
Amendments and were adopted, at least in part, in response to the Dred Scott decision. See
Baker, supra note 186, at 8. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and the Fourteenth
Amendment granted citizenship to the slaves, stating "all persons born or naturalized in the
United States... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV.
[189] 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
[190] 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
[191] 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
[192] U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
[193] Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793) ("A general question of great importance
here occurs. What controversy of a civil nature can be maintained against a State by an
individual?").
[194] Id. at 455 (finding that a state is much like a person in that it can be bound by contract,
incur debts, own property, etc.).
[195] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 14.
[196] U.S. Const. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
[197] See Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36
Am. U. L. Rev. 491, 503 (1987) (defining this phenomenon as the "aggrandizement" problem).
[198] See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1856).
[199] See, e.g., id. at 410 (finding that if the Constitution included African-Americans as
citizens then many of the slave-owning founders acted in flagrant violation of their own
-43-

document); id. at 416-17 (recognizing that the large southern states could not have possibly
meant to include slaves within the meaning of the word "citizen").
[200] Id. at 404.
[201] Id. at 438-39.
[202] Id. at 405.
[203] G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 Va. L. Rev.
1463, 1510 (2003).
[204] Id. (quoting Benjamin C. Howard).
[205] See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426 (noting that African slaves are an "unfortunate race").
[206] Id.
[207] William G. Ross, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? or Both? A Symposium in
Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 733, 762
(2003) (stating that people are increasingly reliant on federal power to protect personal liberties
involving speech, religion, and sexual orientation).
[208] U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
[209] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 90.
[210] The Amendments also barred the use of literacy tests in all state and federal elections
for a period of five years, which was based on a congressional finding that such tests were used
to discriminate against voters based on color. The Amendments further forbade the states from
disqualifying voters for presidential and vice presidential elections because they had not met state
residency requirements. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285 (1970).
[211] Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
[212] Id. at 125 (noting that Congress is the final authority in regulating federal elections).
[213] Id. (interpreting U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 4). Justice Douglas, in concurrence, added that
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment supplied additional justification for
the holding that it was unfair to deny the right to vote to individuals who could fight in wars. Id.
at 141-42 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
argued that the power to set voter qualifications for national elections was expressly committed
to the states by article I, §§ 1 and 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant the federal
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government the power to alter that without an express constitutional amendment. Id. at 201
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan criticized the majority for
disregarding the express intent and understanding of the Framers and invading the area to which
Article V is committed. Id.
[214] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 90.
[215] Id.
[216] In fact, opponents of gay marriage in Massachusetts filed a bill seeking to remove
Supreme Judicial Court Justice Margaret Marshall from the bench after a similar bill targeting all
four Massachusetts justices who voted to legalize gay marriage was proposed. Opponents of gay
marriage file bill to remove SJC chief justice, Associated Press, Boston, May 25, 2004 (on file
with the American University Law Review).
[217] See Laurence Friedman, Symposium on Goodridge v. Department of Public Health:
The (Relative) Passivity of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1,
22-25 (concluding that the decision in Goodridge is a narrow decision that does not constitute
judicial activism). See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
[218] See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
[219] See id. at 963 (recognizing that, among other things, same-sex couples are denied tax
benefits of opposite-sex married couples and must undergo the difficult process of second-parent
adoption).
[220] See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring that Virginia's
anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment).
[221] Id.
[222] See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (Article I of the Constitution grants
Congress broad power to legislate in certain areas. Those legislative powers are, however, limited
not only by the scope of the Framers' affirmative delegation, but also by the principle "that they
may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."
(quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)).
[223] Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
[224] Id. at 634-35.
[225] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 42.
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[226] U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
[227] Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635.
[228] U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
[229] See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (delineating the specific powers of Congress); U.S. Const.
art. II, § 2 (delineating the specific powers of the President); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; U.S. Const.
amend. X (delineating the specific powers of the Judiciary).
[230] See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (noting that the
Constitution created a system of dual sovereignty).
[231] See U.S. Const. amend. X.
[232] See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
[233] See Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America": The Original Intent of the
Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1377, 1381 (1997) ("[B]ecause
the geographical area of a state is smaller than that of the federal government, people who find
state policies and regulations burdensome could 'vote with their feet,' and move to a different
state.").
[234] U.S. Const. art. VI (highlighting the Supremacy Clause).
[235] See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) ("[S]tate courts are absolutely free to
interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do
similar provisions of the United States Constitution.").
[236] See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing numerous incidents in which states have pioneered policies, like
the minimum wage in Massachusetts, that eventually became national policy).
[237] See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the
laws of the United States."); see also Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the
Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1467 (1997).
[238] See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000) ( "With its careful
enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal
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Government are reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the
Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation
of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would
blur and political responsibility would become illusory."). Interestingly, in 1884 the first attempt
to give Congress the power to make uniform marriage and divorce laws was made, followed by
fifty-nine proposed amendments toward that end. Edwin Stein, Past and Present Proposed
Amendments to the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 611, 637,
666 app. (2004). All, of course, have failed, as an extreme encroachment on states' powers. Id. at
638, 664-65.
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